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Abstract 
 
Life and the Symbolic in the Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer 
Craig Leroux 
 
Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms has met with a wide range of reactions 
from his readers, often drawing the criticism that it remains within the rubric of a neo-
Kantian intellectualism. Specifically, Heidegger criticized Cassirer for not recognizing 
the finite and embodied nature of humanity. The present thesis argues that Cassirer holds 
a view of humanity as essentially finite, embodied, and temporal. Further, it argues that 
humanity’s power for self-development stems directly from its limited, yet open, 
character. The first chapter demonstrates that Cassirer advances a conception of human 
life as defined by the symbolic, and a conception of the symbolic that is rooted in human 
embodied life. The second chapter presents Cassirer’s critique of the traditional theories 
of perception and then argues that his notion of symbolic pregnance is key to 
understanding both his theory of perception and the power for humanity to symbolically 
construct its cultural world. The third chapter returns to Cassirer’s conception of life, 
showing that only in virtue of our embodiment is life able to actualize itself, construct its 
cultural world, and advance into the realm of Spirit.  
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Introduction 
As is often noted, Ernst Cassirer was a formidable figure in inter-war German 
philosophy, yet for decades his work was neither widely taught nor studied. Despite this 
lack of recognition from the academy, “the presence of Cassirer can nevertheless be 
established, as it were, in the “margins” and “between the lines” of a number of key 
figures in contemporary thought.”1 Cassirer certainly had an important influence on the 
work of a number of Twentieth Century philosophers, not the least of whom are Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Jürgen Habermas. However, until recently scholarship on Cassirer—
both in English and in German—had been relatively sparse. Moreover, what had been 
published often failed to consider Cassirer’s philosophy on its own terms and to thereby 
do justice to the original and significant contributions in his work. Many early 
commentators (as well as some writing today) simply assumed that since Cassirer’s 
development took place within the Marburg school, that his philosophy adhered to a 
strictly neo-Kantian program. This misinterpretation was undoubtedly aided by the fact of 
Cassirer’s frequent use of terminology loaded with Kantian connotations. But as John 
Michael Krois notes, while the language in which Cassirer writes remains thoroughly 
Kantian, his philosophy does not. In recent years, encouraged by the 1987 publication of 
Krois’s watershed work Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History, as well as the 1996 
posthumous publication of Cassirer’s manuscript for The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 
Volume 4: The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer scholarship has begun to enjoy a 
renaissance. Articles and books on Cassirer are appearing with ever greater frequency, as 
are the convening of conferences and colloquia. Following Krois, scholars studying 
Cassirer have, for the most part, taken a turn toward reading and judging Cassirer’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lofts, S.G., Ernst Cassirer: A “Repetition” of Modernity (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 1. 
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philosophy based on its own merits, seeing it as more than simply another iteration of 
Marburg neo-Kantianism. It is in that spirit of treating Cassirer as a significant and 
original philosopher that this thesis is written. Its project centers around the issue of 
Cassirer’s conception of the human subject. 
One of Cassirer’s earliest yet most enduring critics—certainly the one who looms 
largest today—was Martin Heidegger. In March of 1929 Cassirer and Heidegger met for 
their famed debate at Davos. While the topic was ostensibly their respective 
interpretations of Kant, the written protocol of the debate demonstrates that the dialogue 
was quite far reaching and included topics like finitude and infinitude, truth, and freedom. 
In the course of the debate Heidegger invoked a distinction, often used by Cassirer, to 
compare their respective philosophies—the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem. 
Cassirer had raised the distinction himself earlier in the debate with reference to Kant, 
asserting that Heidegger had mistaken Kant’s schematism for his terminus ad quem, 
when in fact it was Kant’s terminus a quo. Heidegger asserted that Cassirer’s own 
terminus ad quem is the multitude of the symbolic forms, but calls into question the 
clarity of Cassirer’s terminus a quo. 
In the first lecture, Cassirer used the expressions terminus a quo and terminus ad 
quem. One could say that for Cassirer the terminus ad quem is the whole of a 
philosophy of culture in the sense of an elucidation of the wholeness of the forms 
of the shaping consciousness. For Cassirer, the terminus a quo is utterly 
problematical…Cassirer’s point is to emphasize the various forms of the shaping 
in order, with a view to these shapings, subsequently to point out a certain 
dimension of the shaping powers themselves.2 
 
In respect of his own philosophy, Heidegger maintains that the terminus a quo is what he 
clearly develops—the meaning of Being for Dasein—and then goes on to ask whether his 
own terminus ad quem is also clear. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gordon p. 191. 
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My position is the reverse: The terminus a quo is my central problematic, the one 
I develop. The question is: is the terminus ad quem as clear for me? For me, this 
occurs not in the whole of a Philosophy of Culture, but rather in the question ti to 
on; or rather; what in general is called Being? For me, it was from this question 
that the problematic of a metaphysics of Dasein arose in order to derive a ground 
for the basic problem of metaphysics.3 
 
Heidegger presents his terminus a quo, the question of the meaning of Being for Dasein, 
as arising in the course of considering what would be required to address the question of 
what Being itself is. He thus suggests that Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms, 
which does not begin from a detailed analytic of Dasein, is therefore insufficiently 
grounded.  Heiedgger also levels this criticism in his review of the second volume of the 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. While Heidegger acknowledges the great benefit that 
Cassirer’s studies may prove to be for the positive science of myth, he questions whether 
the philosophical significance of the work can be understood in the absence of a detailed 
analytic of Dasein. Heidegger writes, “The interpretation of the essence of myth as a 
possibility of human Dasein remains accidental and directionless as long as it is not 
founded on a radical ontology of Dasein in the light of the problem of Being in general.”4 
The thrust of Heidegger’s criticism is that without a proper investigation into the 
constitution of Dasein, we cannot securely ground Cassirer’s analysis of myth—or any 
other symbolic form—as a properly philosophical investigation. To be sure, Cassirer does 
not undertake such an analysis in an explicit way within the Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms. But it would be a mistake to assume that Cassirer’s philosophy is not founded 
upon a conception of the nature of the human subject. 
To begin, we should ask whether such a preparatory analytic—of the nature 
suggested by Heidegger—is methodologically required by Cassirer or whether it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gordon p. 191. 
4 Heidegger, Review of Ernst Cassirer’s Mythical Thought, p. 41. 
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methodologically excluded from Cassirer’s philosophy. For Cassirer, the task of 
providing a positive account of subject is a metaphysical task. However, as early as 
Substance and Function, Cassirer established his view that metaphysics makes 
distinctions out of what are otherwise essentially unities. “The characteristic procedure of 
metaphysics does not consist in transcending the field of knowledge in general,—for 
beyond this field there would not be even material for a possible question,—but in 
separating correlate standpoints within the field of knowledge itself, and thus 
transforming what is logically correlative into an opposition of things.” Common 
metaphysical distinctions like “subject” and “object,” “inner” and “outer,” are 
distinctions based on theoretical differences that we draw, rather than some observation 
of phenomenal reality itself. The act of drawing these distinctions typically results in the 
creation of two separate spheres between which no mediation can be accomplished. Once 
we posit, for example, the body and soul as two substantially different things, we are 
unable to re-join them in an essential unity. But for Cassirer, once these metaphysical 
distinctions are drawn, there is no hope of reuniting them. The unity of these oppositions 
lies prior to metaphysical thinking, it lies in the lived world. The methodological 
consequences of this are clear. If Cassirer is to properly engage in a phenomenological 
inquiry then he cannot import metaphysical distinctions into a terminus a quo from the 
beginning, because it will have the effect of colouring the entire investigation. Moreover, 
the human subject—consciousness—is not a thing that we can investigate by a merely 
reflective inquiry. Consciousness can only show itself to through its activity. This 
methodological implication can been seen even more clearly when we consider Cassirer’s 
characterization of Natorp. 
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We can never lay bare the immediate life and being of consciousness as such. But 
it is a significant task to seek a new aspect and meaning for the unhalting process 
of objectivization by exploring it in a twofold direction: from terminus a quo to 
terminus ad quem and back again. In Natorp’s opinion, it is only by a continuous 
back and forth, by this twofold direction of method that the object of psychology 
can be made visible as such.5 
 
Thus for Cassirer the process of making consciousness visible is one which requires both 
a phenomenological analysis of its constructive efforts and actions, and then a 
corresponding “reconstruction” of the conditions of the possibility of those constructions. 
As Crowe notes, “This implies that a turn back to the factical, to the realm of the 
constituted in it’s [sic] factical and historical multiplicity, provides a critical check on the 
success of the initial transcendental turn from the constituted to the constituting.”6 
 For Cassirer the human subject is not a fixed entity. It both constructs its world 
and itself. Therefore an investigation of the human subject is intimately linked with the 
investigation into what it creates. The philosophy of symbolic forms, in tracing the forms 
of myth, language, and theoretical knowledge is at once an investigation into the products 
and the constitution of consciousness—both actively develop throughout the 
investigation. In an important sense, it is therefore only at the end of the investigation that 
it is possible to summarize the results for the existential constitution of the subject. 
However, Cassirer never did return to an explicit analysis of the nature of the human 
subject. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that such a conception of human 
nature was altogether lacking from Cassirer’s philosophy. It is therefore the subject of 
this thesis to show that throughout the Philosophy of the Symbolic Forms, Cassirer holds 
a conception of human life as being permeated by the symbolic, whose embodiment 
represents both limitation and the possibility for exceeding those limitations. It should be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 PSF 3 p. 53. 
6 Crowe, “Between Termini”, p. 100. 
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noted that this is exactly the conception of human being which Heidegger asserts is not 
recognized by Cassirer. Heidegger argues: 
I believe that what I describe by Dasein does not allow translation into a concept 
of Cassirer’s. Should one say consciousness, that is precisely what I rejected. 
What I call Dasein is essentially codetermined—not just through what we 
describe as spirit, and not just through what we call living. Rather, it depends on 
the original unity and the immanent structure of the relatedness of a human being, 
which to a certain extent has been fettered in a body and which, in the fetteredness 
in the body, stands in a particular condition of being bound up with beings. In the 
midst of this it finds itself, not in the sense of a spirit that gazes down upon it, but 
rather in the sense that Dasein, thrown into the midst of beings, carries out as free 
an incursion into entities, an incursion that is always historical and, in the ultimate 
sense, contingent.7 
 
In opposition to Heidegger’s assessment of Cassirer’s philosophy, I will show that 
Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms entails a conception of the human subject as 
being an essential unity whose embodiment and historical temporality are the conditions 
for the possibility of meaning and action. Specifically, in the first chapter we will show 
that Cassirer’s conception of the symbolic is closely bound up with his conception of life, 
so much so that the model he employs for the symbolic is the relationship between body 
and soul. In the second chapter we will turn to Cassirer’s theory of perception as founded 
upon his notion of symbolic pregnance. We will first show how he rejects the traditional 
theories of perception because they fail to account for the simultaneity of the material and 
intellectual factors of perception. We will then go on to show how his conception of 
symbolic pregnance allows for such simultaneity, and further that meaningful perceptive 
experience is possible only by virtue of our temporality. Finally, in the third chapter we 
shall consider Cassirer’s metaphysics of life and spirit, showing that he does not hold to a 
view of humanity as existing primarily in an “infinite realm”, but rather that we are 
fundamentally tied to our finite bodies and conditioned by them. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Gordon, Continental Divide, 194-195. 
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Chapter 1: Life and the Symbol 
The concept of life and the concept of the symbol are closely related in Cassirer’s 
philosophy of symbolic forms. In this chapter I aim to show how Cassirer conceives of 
human life as being thoroughly symbolic and how, in turn, he conceives of the symbolic 
function as rooted in the phenomenon of life. In the first section I begin by providing 
context for Cassirer’s symbolic shift, outlining how his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 
emerges as a response both to Kant and to the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. I then 
show how his focus on the symbol applies not only to the various products of human 
culture, but equally that it involves a rethinking of the character of human life. In the 
second section I further investigate Cassirer’s notion of the symbolic, showing that it 
encompasses not only cultural products, but also human consciousness as such. We will 
further see that Cassirer’s model of symbolism takes its origin not from the phenomenon 
of language, as is typical for many philosophers, but rather from the phenomenon of life. 
 
1.1 The Symbolic Character of Life 
It is generally accepted that Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason marked a 
new direction in philosophy. Discontented with the dogmatic state of metaphysics and the 
proliferation of skepticism on multiple philosophical fronts, Kant effected a “Copernican 
revolution” to finally establish a firm footing for knowledge, specifically in the mode of 
mathematics and the natural sciences, and to demonstrate the possibility of valid, 
synthetic a priori propositions—tasks in which he found both rationalism and empiricism 
to have failed. This revolution saw Kant turn toward the subject, rather than the object, as 
conditioning the structure of our experience. By making the objects of our experience 
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conform to the subjective a priori conditions of that experience, he cast the knowing 
subject in an active role at the centre of knowledge—demonstrating that the subject 
contains within itself an autonomous reason that forms the basis of both natural and 
moral lawfulness. The Kantian subject, through its faculties of the understanding, 
sensibility, and imagination, is able to provide the basis upon which its experience of 
reality is spontaneously ordered, thus allowing reality to be both apprehensible and 
comprehensible. In other words, the transcendental ego is the condition for the possibility 
of any experience whatever. 
The latter years of Kant’s life, and the decades after his death, saw ever-
increasing advances in the natural sciences and mathematics, as well as the emergence of 
the idealist philosophies of Fichte, Schelling an Hegel. As Skidelsky observes, “Since the 
time of Kant, philosophers had been struck by the contrast between the successful 
accumulation of natural scientific knowledge and the fruitless to and fro of metaphysical 
debate.”8 The rise of positivism in the latter half of the nineteenth century was due largely 
to opposition to idealism as well as the limitations that Kantian philosophy, with its ties 
to Newtonian physics, had placed on the scientific method. Positivist and materialist 
philosophies divested the natural sciences of any reliance on an externally derived logic 
or all-encompassing reason and, correspondingly, of any larger significance in the 
broader realm of human culture. It was chiefly in opposition to post-Kantian idealism and 
positivism that neo-Kantians took up the call to go “Back to Kant!” By no means a united 
front, the southwest school (which would prove a lasting influence on Heidegger), led by 
Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, rejected the natural sciences as the pinnacle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Skidelsky, Edward. Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008), 9. 
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of reason and asserted history as the model of thought for understanding humanity. Their 
work contributed in large part to a broader revolt against the natural sciences and reason 
in general. Conversely, the Marburg school, led by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, did 
not allow its critique of positivism to descend into an outright rejection of reason. Instead 
they reasserted reason as the pinnacle of human culture, demonstrating “that scientific 
rationality is only ever a particular specification of a more universal concept of reason, at 
work in all departments of culture.”9 They also sought to return to a Kantian model and to 
re-establish the knowing subject as an active force in the construction of knowledge—
making the products of the scientific method not simply reproductions or copies of reality 
(as they are for the positivists), but the very constitution of its lawfulness. 
It was within this context of Marburg neo-Kantianism that Ernst Cassirer’s early 
philosophical development took place. To be sure, as a student of Cohen and Natorp, 
Cassirer’s work was significantly influenced by them. Perhaps most importantly, 
Cassirer’s philosophy takes very seriously the idea that the knowing subject plays an 
active role in structuring its experience of reality and in forming knowledge. Cassirer 
repeatedly argues against any form of a copy theory of knowledge, where what we know 
is simply a mere reproduction from the world of our experience. But while Cassirer’s 
early philosophy was clearly grounded in Marburg neo-Kantianism, his mature 
philosophy represents a turn away from Marburg. Where Cohen saw the central task of 
philosophy to be the grounding of the rapidly advancing mathematical and natural 
sciences, Cassirer reversed directions making reason (in the mode of scientific, 
conceptual thinking) the end, not the beginning, of human creativity and knowledge. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer, 25. 
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Skidelsky notes, this allowed Cassirer to incorporate a wider range of human experience 
into his philosophy: 
Only Cassirer—and here he did break with Marburg—no longer conceived the 
unity of culture as a unity of reason. He viewed the various forms of culture not as 
products of a universal faculty but as aspects of our symbolic self-expression. 
This revision enabled him to do justice, as the Marburg school could not, to the 
emotional, sensuous side of life…Cassirer could thus combat the accusation of 
“one-sided rationalism” frequently leveled against the Marburg school.10 
 
It is this move toward the symbol and the symbolic that marks the most significant and 
transformative aspect of Cassirer’s philosophy. But despite Cassirer’s advances, many of 
his early commentators, as well as some writing today, interpret his philosophy as 
remaining within the framework of neo-Kantianism. This interpretation is likely aided by 
the fact that Cassirer never made a public break from Marburg—even asserting at the 
Davos debate with Heidegger that he did not see his own work as a “defection” from 
Cohen.11 As Skidelsky notes, “…however sympathetic his motives, Cassirer’s failure to 
make a clean break with his predecessors was strategically a disaster. It allowed his 
opponents to present him as a man of the past, a purveyor of obsolete ideas.”12 
But the central ideas of Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms were far from obsolete. 
In fact they marked a significant and novel shift away from both the traditional Kantian 
and neo-Kantian projects. As Cassirer himself notes,13 many of the key themes developed 
in the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms originated in his earlier work, Substance and 
Function. However, it is in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms where Cassirer broadens 
his project beyond the epistemology of the sciences and brings these themes to a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer, 49. 
11 cf. Gordon, Peter. Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), 144. 
12 Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer, 49. 
13 cf. Cassirer, Ernst. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 1: Language (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1953), xiii. (Hereafter cited as PSFv1.) 
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complete elaboration. The most significant shift, as Skidelsky notes, consists in the 
central importance that Cassirer gives to the notion of the symbol: 
The basic principle of culture is no longer identified with reason, in its theoretical 
and ethical guises, but with the more inclusive notion of the symbol. This makes a 
crucial difference. The concept of symbolism, unlike that of reason, embraces all 
dimensions of human existence. The sensuous, emotive facets of life are no longer 
pathological in Kant’s sense; they have their own possibilities of cultural 
expression…”14 
 
With this emphasis on the role of the symbol, Cassirer effected a shift from the “critique 
of reason” to the “critique of culture,” recognizing that our knowledge of the objective 
world is not originally formed by the pure reason of the Kantian transcendental subject, 
but through the multitude of symbolic interactions that we have with our world. It is these 
symbolic interactions which are responsible for the progressive development of reason in 
human cultural life. But it is not only the development of our cultural products that is 
affected by this shift to the symbolic. Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms is equally 
a shift in thought about the nature of the subject—human being itself. This central insight 
of the importance of the symbolic led Cassirer, when considering the fundamental 
difference between human life and animal life in An Essay on Man, to characterize 
human being as animal symbolicum.15 
For Cassirer, life is a Urphänomen, a basis phenomenon, which is primary and 
which therefore cannot be elucidated in terms of a definition, nor explained in terms of 
more fundamental causes. “The fundamental reality, the Urphänomen, in the sense of 
Goethe, the ultimate phenomenon may, indeed, be designated by the term “life”. This 
phenomenon is accessible to everyone; but it is “incomprehensible” in the sense that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer, 100. 
15 Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 26. (Hereafter cited as EM) 
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admits of no definition, no abstract theoretical explanation.”16 For Cassirer, the 
phenomenon of life is not something fixed, it is a dynamic process. As life, human beings 
are thus characterized by process but they are additionally the kind of being which is not 
only engaged in the process of life, but which also becomes conscious of its own life 
through the symbolic forms. As Cassirer writes, “…myth, religion, art, science are 
nothing else than the different steps made by man in his consciousness, in his reflective 
interpretation of life. Each of them is a mirror of our human experience which, as it were, 
possesses its own angle of refraction.”17 Human life, in so far as it is capable of 
understanding and reflection, cannot be reduced to the sort of life that characterizes the 
animal world. Human life contains something more than animal life. The traditional way 
of distinguishing humans from animals is to say that humans have a capacity which 
animals lack—a capacity for reason. Hence human being is animal rationale. But this is 
not a characterization that Cassirer accepts. 
As already mentioned, reason is not something that Cassirer takes to be given to 
humanity in a complete and final state. It is something that develops along with human 
culture, over the course of time. The rationality exhibited in the creations of primitive 
man, for example, is surely almost unrecognizable when compared to the rationality 
exhibited in our modern scientific and cultural accomplishments. Therefore, instead of 
animal rationale, in An Essay on Man Cassirer identifies human life as animal 
symbolicum and in so doing rejects what he sees as the tendency of the rationalist 
tradition, culminating in Hegel, to reduce the various concrete manifestations of Spirit to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Cassirer, Ernst. “Language and Art II,” in Symbol, Myth, Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), 193-194. 
17 Cassirer, “Language and Art II,” 194. 
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a universal principle of reason or logic.18 Cassirer argues that “Reason is a very 
inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man’s cultural life in all their 
richness and variety. Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should 
define him as an animal symbolicum.”19 
Although the symbol is a uniquely human phenomenon, Cassirer does not deny 
that animals regularly engage in symbolic-like behaviors. He cites the examples of 
Pavlov’s dog-conditioning experiments and Yerkes’ token-reward experiments with apes 
as examples of behaviors related to the representative nature of stimuli.20 But Cassirer 
notes an important distinction between the capacities of animals and humans, which he 
elucidates in terms of the difference between the signal and the symbol. “Symbols—in 
the proper sense of this term—cannot be reduced to mere signals. Signals and symbols 
belong to two different universes of discourse: a signal is a part of the physical world of 
being; a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning. Signals are “operators”; 
symbols are “designators.””21 Whereas signals remain tied to their physical environment 
and are related to their reference only by an association, symbols have an essential 
functional value that is not reducible to their physical presence: they possess a meaning. 
While animals regularly react to signals, as when a dog reacts to changes in his master’s 
behaviour, they do not exhibit the capacity to recognize symbols. To clarify the 
distinction between signs and symbols Cassirer cites the example of the discovery of 
names by Helen Keller22 who, while already able to associate certain tactile impressions 
(signals) with certain things, had a new world opened up to her upon discovering that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See PSFv1, 83. 
19 EM, 26. 
20 EM, 28. 
21 EM, 32. 
22 See PSFv3, 112f. and EM, 33ff. 
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things have names, like “water” or “door.” Names, as symbols contain more than a mere 
association, they contain a reference to a range of phenomenon within a meaningful 
totality. The movement from signals to symbols, as Cassirer argues, causes a change in 
one’s relation to the world by enacting a symbolic distance. As he explains, 
When the representative function of names has thus dawned on a child, his whole 
inner attitude toward reality has changed—a fundamentally new relation between 
subject and object has come into being. Only now do the objects which hitherto 
acted directly on the emotions and will begin in a sense to recede into the 
distance: into a distance where they can be “looked at,” “intuited,” in which they 
can be actualized in their spatial outlines and independent qualitative 
determinations.23 
 
The distance that is enacted by the symbol constitutes a break in the immediate 
relationship that dominates animal life, the relationship between what Uexküll’s biology 
refers to as the “receptor system” and the “effector system.” The stimuli that an animal 
receives through its receptors occasion a more or less predictable type of reaction or 
movement through its effector system. For humans this process of stimulus and reaction 
can be mediated by a process of thought, which itself cannot occur without the aid of the 
symbolic.  As Cassirer notes, this marks a crucial difference between mere reaction and 
human responses. “There is an unmistakable difference between organic reactions and 
human responses. In the first case a direct and immediate answer is given to an outward 
stimulus; in the second case the answer is delayed. It is interrupted and retarded by a slow 
and complicated process of thought.”24 The “shell” of the immediacy of an animal’s 
environment, from which it cannot break free, is an un-distanced outlook on its world, 
unmediated by thought or the symbolic function, resulting in an inability to have its 
world as an object for it. This act of attaining a distance from the world through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 PSFv3, 113. 
24 EM, 24. 
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symbolic is not something that can happen all at once. In fact, the building of our 
symbolic world is the very theme of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. As 
Cassirer summarizes, “Language and art, myth and theoretical knowledge all contribute 
to…this process of mental distanciation: they are the major stages on the path which 
leads from the space of what can be grasped and effected, in which the animal lives and 
within which it remains confined, to the space of sensory experience and thought, to the 
horizon of the mind.”25 Both within the progress of each symbolic form, and in the 
transition from one form to another, human understanding and culture progressively 
increase their distance from the immediacy of life and move into the realm of spirit. 26 
Habermas agrees with and confirms what we have just said about Cassirer—that 
the creation of meaning through symbolic formation is a distinctly human mode of 
existence—when he writes: 
…the fact that sensory contact with the world is reworked into something 
meaningful through the use of symbols is the defining feature of human existence, 
and also constitutes, from a normative standpoint, the basic trait of a properly 
human mode of being. In other words, the objectifying force of symbolic 
mediation breaks the animal immediacy of a nature which impacts on the 
organism from within and without; it thereby creates that distance from the world 
which makes possible a thoughtful, reflectively controlled reaction to the world 
on the part of subjects who are able to say ‘no’.27 
 
This capacity for thought and reflection, and the ability to say “no,” constitutes what 
Habermas calls “the liberating power of symbols.” This is a characterization that Cassirer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Cassirer, Geist und Leben, ed. Ernst W. Orth pp. 45ff. as quoted in Habermas, “The Liberating Power of 
Symbols,” p. 8. 
26 It should be noted here that Cassirer does not view the term “spirit” as denoting a substantial entity. In 
his own words: “We must not understand the term “Geist” or spirit as designating a metaphysical entity 
opposed to another called “matter.”… The term “Geist” is correct; but we must not use it as a name of a 
substance—a thing “quod in se est et per se concipitur.” We should use it in a functional sense as a 
comprehensive name for all those functions which constitute and build up the world of human culture.” 
Cassirer, Ernst. “Structuralism in Modern Linguistics” in Word: Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New 
York 1: 113-114. 
27 Habermas, “The Liberating Power of Symbols,” 7. 
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would undoubtedly agree with, given his conclusion in An Essay on Man that “Human 
culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man’s progressive self-
liberation. Language, art, religion, science, are various phases in this process. In all of 
them man discovers and proves a new power—the power to build up a world of his own, 
an “ideal” world.”28 
So far we have seen how Cassirer’s shift to a philosophy centered around the 
symbol represents not only a reinterpretation of our human culture and its products, but 
equally of the subjective aspect of human life itself. This reformulation led Cassirer to 
characterize man as animal symbolicum, rather than animal rationale. We saw that 
symbols create a distance between human being and its world, allowing humanity to 
break away from an animal immediacy and to reflect upon itself and the world. Finally, 
we suggested that this symbolic distance provides the power for humanity to build up its 
own ideal world. What we have therefore shown is that human life is thoroughly 
characterized by the symbolic, and that life makes use of symbols to construct its world. 
In the next section, we will demonstrate that Cassirer’s notion of the symbolic is, in turn, 
rooted in the phenomenon of life. We shall trace the development of Cassirer’s model for 
understanding the symbolic backwards from language, through myth, and finally to body-
soul relation which constitutes human life. 
 
1.2 Life as the Prototype of the Symbolic 
As mentioned above, the symbolic is a defining element of human life. But just 
what exactly is the origin of Cassirer’s conception of the symbolic? This has not yet been 
made clear. Indeed, Skidelsky observes that the term “symbol” is capable of causing 	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some confusion. “Modern readers are apt to be mislead by the term, taking it in its 
standard sense to refer to crowns, crucifixes, and the like.”29 It is correct that the term 
“symbol,” in its usual usage, is associated solely with those products of human culture 
which we somehow endow with a meaning. But as Skidelsky continues, “Cassirer’s 
concept of symbolism refers in the first instance not to cultural artifacts but to a natural 
potency inherent in consciousness as such.”30 Cassirer sees the symbolic function at work 
not only in our manufactured cultural icons and in our systems of language and science, 
but also in every meaningful perceptual experience. And thus he articulates his expanded 
notion of the symbolic: 
We on the other hand have given the concept of the symbol another and broader 
meaning from the very start. In it we have attempted to encompass the totality of 
those phenomena in which the sensuous is in any way filled with meaning, in 
which a sensuous content, while preserving the mode of its existence and 
facticity, represents a particularization and embodiment, a manifestation and 
incarnation of a meaning.31 
 
This broadened definition means that the symbolic is present whenever we are presented 
with a meaning, including the sensuous phenomena of our perceptive experience. While 
we will consider the symbolic nature of perception in detail in the next chapter, we 
should note that these two realms of the symbolic led Cassirer to make an important 
distinction between “artificial” and “natural” symbolism. 
Artificial symbols are those that are made by human beings: the objects, texts or 
similarly embodied, sensuous things that we endow with meaning. For example, the 
words that combine to constitute a language are artificial symbols because they are 
constructed by human beings. Artificial symbols are what constitute the symbolic forms, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer, 101. 
30 Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer, 101. 
31 PSFv3, 93. 
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and it is the character of such symbols to partake of some degree of arbitrariness. For 
example, the word designating a particular phenomenon, say “red,” could be different 
than it is since different languages have different words and syntactical structures. As 
Krois notes, in the case of artificial symbols we use an energy of the mind to impart a 
meaning. He cites Cassirer’s definition of symbolic form that each involves an “energy of 
the mind by which an intelligible content of meaning is attached to a concrete, sensory 
sign.”32 Natural symbolism, on the other hand, refers to the fact that our perception 
always involves a factor of representation which is not created by us (at least not in any 
intentional sense) yet which makes possible the presentation of meaningful perceptual 
content. Natural symbolism is closely connected to Cassirer’s notion of symbolic 
pregnance (which we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter), which is “the way in 
which a perception as a sensory experience contains a meaning which it immediately and 
concretely represents.”33 One can see why Krois observes that the natural symbolism we 
find in perception, and the artificial symbolism we find in symbolic forms, involve 
opposites directions of meaning. “In the case of symbolic form we can speak of the 
intentionality of meaning, but in the case of symbolic pregnance the directionality of 
meaning has been reversed; the sensory contains a meaning which it presents.”34 While 
these two forms of symbolism are complementary, one is afforded an explanatory priority 
over the other. For Cassirer, it is the natural symbols that are primary since we cannot 
properly understand artificial signs as the origin of the power of signification, but only as 
an application of it. It is for that reason that Cassirer, in his general introduction "to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Krois, John Michael. "Cassirer’s "Prototype and Model" of Symbolism : Its Sources and Significance," 
Science in Context 12: 540. 
33 PSF v.3, 202. 
34 Krois, “Prototype and Model”, 540. 
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Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, writes that an understanding of how we build up our great 
systems of symbolic forms requires us to first understand how the symbolic is rooted in 
our natural consciousness. 
We must go back to “natural” symbolism, to that representation of consciousness 
as a whole which is necessarily contained or at least projected in every single 
moment and fragment of consciousness, if we wish to understand the artificial 
symbols, the arbitrary signs which consciousness creates in language, art, and 
myth. The force and effect of these mediating signs would remain a mystery if 
they were not ultimately rooted in an original spiritual process which belongs to 
the very essence of consciousness.35 
 
But this demand that Cassirer makes—the demand to seek out a natural basis for the 
power of signification, rather than view it as simply an artificial power of the intellect—
runs counter to the customary way in which philosophers have tended to view the 
symbolic. 
The model typically employed for understanding the symbolic power employed—
a model used both by Cassirer’s contemporaries as well as by those who followed him—
is language. As Krois notes, taking language as the model for the symbolic requires a 
theory which sees symbols simply as creations of arbitrary relations between a signifier 
and a signified, based purely upon convention. He cites Saussure as an example: 
Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the 
semiological process; that is why language, the most complex and universal of all 
systems of expression is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can 
become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is 
only one particular semiological system.36 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 PSF v.1, 105-106. 
36 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1966), 68. As quoted by Krois, John 
Michael, “Prototype and Model”, 533. 
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Indeed, it is a model that Krois argues Cassirer also took up, at least during his early 
work on The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. 37 There, Krois argues, Cassirer regarded 
language as central to understanding the symbolic and it was largely the influence of 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s philosophy of language that led Cassirer to this conception. 
Habermas, also observing this point, writes: “Cassirer’s original achievement consists in 
a semiotic transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy…Cassirer was the first to 
perceive the paradigmatic significance of Humboldt’s philosophy of language…”38 Krois 
furthers our understanding of Humboldt’s influence by noting that: “Cassirer first 
developed his conception of symbolic forms utilizing a distinction he borrowed from 
Humboldt’s philosophy of language. Humboldt distinguished between language as a 
fixed structure, as “Ergon,” and language as a process, “Energia,”…Cassirer defined 
symbolic forms as the energies by which concrete sensory signs are related to contents of 
meaning.”39 Conceiving language as Energia, as an energy, means understanding it as a 
process and as a potential for the development of meaning. Language is not simply an 
Ergon, a product which, once created, remains fixed and lifeless. Thus Cassirer notes, 
“Language like art cannot be conceived as a mere work of the spirit, but must be regarded 
as a form of spiritual energy.”40 As Cassirer writes, this character of language as an 
energy for the creation of meaning allows it to overcome the opposition between subject 
and object: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 I find that there is a least a prima fascia case for doubting Krois argument that language serves as a 
model for the symbolic generally for Cassirer in the first volume The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, since 
that is where Cassirer makes the call to return to natural symbolism. Nevertheless Cassirer’s thinking was 
clearly influenced by considering language and so much of Krois argument holds. 
38 Here Habermas is referring to Cassirer’s treatment of Humboldt in the 1923 essay “The Kantian Element 
in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Philosophy of Language.” 
39 Krois, John Michael. “The Priority of “Symbolism” over Language in Cassirer’s Philosophy,” Synthese, 
published online 2009: 3.  
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For Humboldt, the phonetic sign which represents the material of all language 
formation is in a sense the bridge between the subjective and objective, because in 
it the essential factors of the two are combined. For on the one hand the sound is 
spoken, that is, produced and formed by ourselves; but on the other hand, as a 
sound heard, it is a part of the sensible reality that surrounds us. We apprehend 
and know it as something both “inward” and “outward”—as an inward energy 
which assumes objective form in the outward world.”41 
 
It is this capacity of symbolic form to overcome the opposition between subject and 
object that Habermas has in mind when he writes that Cassirer transformed Kant’s 
philosophy. “By commandeering Kant’s notion of the transcendental, so to speak, and 
transforming the world-constituting activity of the knowing subject into the world-
disclosing function of the trans-subjective form of language, it exploded the architectonic 
of the philosophy of consciousness as a whole. Symbolic form overcomes the opposition 
of subject and object.”42 But in the passage just cited, by identifying language as the 
transcendental aspect of Cassirer’s philosophy, Habermas shows us that he sees language 
as being Cassirer’s essential model for the symbolic, generally. This is also demonstrated 
when Habermas later suggests that Cassirer did not fully realize the implications of his 
own innovations, and that in order to take his project to its completion, Cassirer would 
have had to “transform the heuristic priority which the transcendental analysis of 
language…does in fact enjoy in his researches into a systematic priority. He would have 
had to give language and the lifeworld a central position in the construction of symbolic 
forms.” 43 What Habermas fails to realize, but what Krois sees quite clearly, is that while 
the development of Cassirer’s notion of the symbolic begins with language and with his 
reading of Humboldt, it does not end there. Language does not remain the paradigmatic 
case for the symbolic in general. 	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42 Habermas, “The Liberating Power of Symbols”, 15. 
43 Habermas, “The Liberating Power of Symbols”, 22. 
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Cassirer’s shift away from language as the model for the symbolic runs counter to 
the trend among many philosophers who base their philosophies of the symbol, their 
semiotics, upon it. But while language, as a system of arbitrary signs, represents an 
application of the symbolic power, it does not suffice to account for this power generally. 
Krois notes that Cassirer does accept that artificial signs do indeed have a conventional 
nature. “Cassirer admitted in his discussions with Moritz Schlick that cultural signs have 
an arbitrary and conventional nature, but this only emphasized for him the importance of 
the question how it was possible that something sensory ever becomes a carrier of 
meaning.”44 While language may well characterize those artificial signs that constitute 
the symbolic forms, given its arbitrary nature, it surely cannot characterize the natural 
symbolism that constitutes our perception. Cassirer comes closer to explicating a model 
for symbolism in general when he turns his attention to the symbolic form of mythical 
thought. 
In the period between the publication of the first and second volumes of the 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Cassirer discovered the wealth of the Warburg Library, 
including its unique collection of works on symbolism, anthropology, and ethnography. 
The research that Cassirer conducted at the Warburg Library had a profound impact on 
the direction of the project of the philosophy of symbolic forms and, as Krois observes, in 
the process of writing the second and third volumes of The Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms Cassirer’s thought “…underwent a change, and this change is what actually led to 
the “symbolic turn” in his philosophy. Until this change occurred—midway in his 
writing—his thought remained within the framework of philosophy of language.”45 	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Thanks to the Warburg Library, Cassirer gained access to a collection of books which he 
found, quite literally, to be organized around the same questions that he was in fact 
dealing with. In the course of his reading, Cassirer developed an understanding of the 
symbol as instantiated in structures much more basic than language—structures such as 
gesture and ritual. As more basic than language, these types of symbolic behaviors cannot 
be reduced to, nor understood by, a model of the symbolic based on language. This led 
Cassirer to posit the symbolic form of mythical thought as the primary symbolic form. 
Here we encounter a law that holds equally for all symbolic forms, and bears 
essentially on their evolution. None of them arise initially as separate, 
independently recognizable forms, but every one of them must first be 
emancipated from the common matrix of myth. All mental contents, no matter 
how truly they evince a separate systematic realm and a ‘principle’ of their own, 
are actually known to us only as thus involved and grounded. Theoretical, 
practical and aesthetic consciousness, the world of language and of morality, the 
basic forms of the community and the state—they are all originally tied up with 
mythico-religious conceptions.46 
 
Whereas the symbols involved in language are constructed and exhibit a clear 
arbitrariness, the nature of symbols proper to mythical life do not present themselves as 
being arbitrary, but rather appear to place us in direct contact with what they represent. 
For example, a Mayan community may hold the mountain in whose valley they live to 
represent a great God who nourishes and protects their community. But the mountain is 
not simply representing the God as the word “apple” represents the familiar fruit it 
designates, rather the mountain is perceived to be the God itself, and therefore is not an 
arbitrary symbol.47 
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By the time of the publication of the second volume of the Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms, language no longer represented the paradigmatic case of the symbolic. 
Rather, Cassirer established the symbolic form of myth as that from which all others must 
develop. The symbolic structures that constitute mythical life, things like gestures and 
rituals, are more primitive than language. But that is not to suggest that they are somehow 
less valid or less symbolic. Rather, mythical thought is more primitive than language in 
the sense that it has not yet come to incorporate the myriad theoretical distinctions that 
we find in language. Where language conveys a world populated by things and attributes, 
myth has not yet carved up the world in this fashion. “Myth, in particular, shows us a 
world which is far from being without structure, immanent articulation, yet does not 
know the organization of reality according to things and attributes. Here all 
configurations of being show a peculiar fluidity; they are differentiated without being 
separated from one another.”48 In myth the differentiations that are present in our 
theoretical understanding—the division of the world into genera and species, things and 
attributes—are not yet fully formed. Myth is, to use a metaphor, the nursery of all such 
distinctions. 
But we are in danger here of losing the course of our inquiry. Earlier we made it 
clear that the task of this thesis was not to provide an examination of the various 
symbolic forms, but rather to investigate the primary basis for the symbolic in the first 
place. While myth is prior to language, as a symbolic form it is still an artificial, created 
mode of symbolism and not the origin of the symbolic generally. The origin of the 
symbolic can only be found in the realm of our living experience. However, of all the 
symbolic forms, myth comes closest to life and does reveal certain modes of experience 	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which would be otherwise obscured by language or theoretical knowledge. As Cassirer 
suggests, the form of myth places us in direct contact with the world: 
Myth, however, places us in the living center of this sphere, for its particularity 
consists precisely in showing us a mode of world formation which is independent 
of all modes of mere objectivization…Here the phenomenon as it is given in any 
moment never has the character of mere representation, it is one of authentic 
presence: here a reality is not “actualized” through mediation of the phenomenon 
but is present in full actuality in the phenomenon.49 
 
Unlike the theoretical world of the sciences, mythical consciousness does not recognize a 
world that is composed of “things” and “attributes”, rather we find in myth a living 
world, one which is permeated by a “feeling of life”. What the form of myth reveals for 
Cassirer is that our perception is not first of all of things and attributes, but rather that the 
perception of expression takes priority. 
For Cassirer, the view of reality as an aggregate of things, thing-perception, only 
occurs after a more basic mode of perception, expression-perception. In thing-perception 
we are primarily oriented toward an “it”, but in expression-perception the sharp 
differentiation between things is not the dominate factor, and we find ourselves primarily 
oriented toward a “thou.” The world of myth, in which expression-perception is 
dominate, is not a world populated first of all by things and their attributes, rather it is a 
living world populated by expressive characters and forces: 
For the theoretical reality itself was not originally experienced as a totality of 
physical bodies, endowed with definite attributes and qualities. Rather, there is a 
kind of experience of reality which is situated wholly outside this form of 
scientific explanation and interpretation. It is present wherever the being that is 
apprehended in perception confronts us not as a reality of things, of mere objects, 
but as a kind of presence of living subjects.50 
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For Cassirer, we cannot explain our perceptive experience of life based on our perception 
of things. Our perception of a “thou” cannot be reduced to a perception of an “it.” 
Therefore, it is the perception of life, of a thou, which is essentially earlier to the 
perception of things as inanimate collections of attributes. In support of this thesis 
Cassirer cites Kurt Koffka and the example of the recognition of voices and faces in 
young infants, before they are able to recognize concrete objects within the world: 
For the chaos theory, the phenomenon corresponding to a human face is merely a 
confusion of the most divergent sensations of light, dark, color, which moreover 
are in constant flux, changing with every movement of the person in question or 
the child himself, and with the lighting. And yet by the second month the child 
knows his mother’s face; by the middle of his first year he reacts to a friendly or 
angry face, and so differently that there is no doubt what was given to him 
phenomenally was the friendly or angry face and not any distribution of light and 
dark. To explain this by experience, to assume that these phenomenon arose by 
combination of simple optical sensations with each other and with pleasant or 
unpleasant consequences from the original chaos of sensation, seems 
impossible…We are left with the opinion that phenomena such as “friendliness” 
or “unfriendliness” are extremely primitive—even more primitive, for example, 
than that of a blue spot.51 
 
Now while the advent of the linguistic consciousness means that our own everyday world 
is not anything like the experience of mythical consciousness, we nevertheless do not lose 
the fact that the perception of expression precedes that of the expression of things and 
attributes, since ultimately it is expression perception that allows us to perceive the world 
of intentional objects – be it other people or their artificial symbols. “It is the pure fact of 
expression—the fact that a certain phenomenon in its simple “givenness” and visibility 
makes itself known to be inwardly animated—which first and most immediately tells us 
how consciousness, while remaining purely within itself, can at the same time apprehend 
another reality.”52 It is this character of inner animation that is key to the experience of 	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expression, and the prototypical case for any inward animation, as well as for the 
symbolic generally, is the body-soul relationship. 
For Cassirer the body and soul are indissolubly linked. Our experience of our own 
body and our experience of other bodies clearly bears this out. One need only engage in a 
conversation to experience the absolute simultaneity of body and soul. However, this 
original identity is always susceptible to being made into an absolute difference, as 
Cassirer observes, when why try to transform this lived identity into a cognitive unity: 
From the standpoint of pure experience, from the standpoint of consciousness, it 
is certain that we know neither a soul without body, nor a body without soul. On 
the other hand, this known unity is by no means a cognitive unity. Although 
immediate knowledge shows us physical and psychic factors, not only in 
combination but indissolubly linked, we cannot succeed in translating this actual 
bond into a conceptual bond having necessity in the sense of a concept.53 
 
The unity of body and soul cannot survive the transition from the perspective of 
experience to the perspective of theoretical thinking. In this respect the body-soul 
relationship represents a parallel with the symbolic relationship. Neither the body and 
soul relationship, nor the relationship between a symbol and its meaning, can be 
understood as a unity in the terms of causal, substantial thinking. Thus Cassirer writes:  
The relation of the appearance to the psychic meaning that is expressed in it; of 
the word to the meaning present through it, and finally of any abstract sign to the 
meaning content to which it points—all this has no analogy in the manner in 
which things stand side by side in space, in which events follow in time, or in 
which empirical changes are produced by one another; its specific meaning can 
only be taken from itself but not explained through analogies from the world that 
is made possible only by this meaning.54 
 
Therefore, since the relationship expressed in every instance of the symbolic is not 
explainable on the basis of some substantial or causal connection, Cassirer must find 
another paradigm for understanding the symbolic. This paradigm he finds in the body-	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soul relationship that characterizes human life. This relation shows us an inwardly 
animated phenomenon, just as in expression-perception. Therefore, Cassirer concludes 
that: 
The relation between body and soul represents the prototype and model for a 
purely symbolic relation, which cannot be converted into a relation between 
things or into a causal relation. Here there is originally neither an inside and 
outside nor a before and after, neither an agent nor an effect; here we have a 
combination which does not have to be composed of separate elements but which 
is in a primary sense a meaningful whole which interprets itself, which separates 
into a duality of factors in order to interpret itself in them.55 
 
It is in this relationship of the body and soul that Cassirer sees the “model and prototype” 
for all symbolic relations generally. In other words, the symbolic relation is originally 
founded in the relationship of the body and soul that constitutes human life, a relation in 
which we have an original unity, whose differentiation is a self-differentiation required 
for the making present of meaning. This relation applies equally to all modes of 
symbolism—from the artificial symbols of language and the sciences, to the natural 
symbolism present in all of our perceptions. While we have now shown that Cassirer’s 
model for the symbolic is based in the living relation of the body and soul, and have 
touched briefly on the modes of artificial symbolism, to continue our project we must 
now turn to gaining a better understanding of how the symbolic power is at work in our 
perceptive experience. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 PSF v.3, 100. 
	   29	  
Chapter 2: Perception and Symbolic Pregnance 
One could perhaps characterize modern philosophy as a progressive attempt to find a 
secure ground for knowledge. The problem has, of course, been formulated in many 
different ways: Descartes posed the question of how any certain knowledge is possible; 
Kant inquired into the conditions of the possibility for experience; and in the Twentieth 
and Twenty-First Centuries philosopher after philosopher has taken up the question of 
how meaning is possible. These questions, while differing in orientation, are similar in an 
important respect: an attempt at answering any one of them requires some attempt at 
reconciling the disparate nature of the material world and the world of thought, the world 
of empirical contingency and the world of rational necessity. Or, as Cassirer would put it, 
the aspects of matter and form. In the first section of this chapter we shall see how the 
respective attempts of the empiricist and rationalist traditions, as well as Kant’s attempt, 
to reconcile these seeming mutually exclusive worlds ultimately fail to explain the 
phenomenon of perception. In the second section we shall see how Cassirer begins his 
own theory from a position that takes perception to be immediately meaningful, and in 
which the material and intellectual factors are not opposed to each other. We shall see, 
through an exploration of Cassirer’s concept of symbolic pregnance, how the structure of 
the symbolic is immediately present in all of our perception, and how this allows Cassirer 
to do away with the notion of any unformed sensations.  
 
2.1 Cassirer’s Rejection of the Traditional Theories 
As is well known, the empiricist and rationalist traditions approach the problem of 
the meaningfulness of perception from opposite directions. Typically, empiricism asserts 
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that the pure receptivity of the senses, combined with some principle of association of 
impressions, is sufficient to give form to the otherwise unformed, raw impressions with 
which we are continuously presented. Conversely, rationalism asserts the priority of the 
spontaneous formative activity of the mind, relying on autonomous acts of judgment to 
impart form to the data with which our senses present us. Cassirer argues against both 
empiricism and rationalism, maintaining that neither is able to account for how our 
perceptual experience is meaningful, that is, how a genuine synthesis is accomplished. He 
argues, in much the same way that Merleau-Ponty does in the Phenomenology of 
Perception, that although empiricism and rationalism approach perception from opposite 
directions, both make the same fundamental mistake: they uphold an original dichotomy 
between the sensory and the intellectual aspects of perception and are therefore unable to 
account for the relationship between those two aspects. In other words, each presupposes 
original, unformed sensations which must then be rendered intelligible by some 
mechanism after the fact of the original sensation. But neither empiricism nor rationalism 
is able to adequately explain the mechanism of this “synthesis” of impressions. 
According to Cassirer, empiricism, for its part, “underestimates the importance of 
the purely intellectual factors and moreover…presents an inadequate and distorted picture 
of sensibility, which it limits to “impressions,” to the immediate givenness of simple 
sensations.”56 Empiricism claims that our senses receive impressions from the world 
which are then ordered through some principle of association, itself present in the 
impressions themselves. For example, the likeness and proximity of impressions of the 
quality “red” might cause one to recognize an apple. But Cassirer denies that there is a 
layer of raw impressions that is prior to perception and which are then combined through 	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some mechanism, since nowhere in our experience do we ever find such a layer of 
unformed impressions. What we do find in our experience are things that are always 
already in some form; things like apples which, since we already perceive them as 
unities, we can then say that they have properties like “red.” Moreover, he argues that the 
meaning and mechanism of “association,” is never fully elaborated by empiricist 
philosophers. There are innumerable criteria with which we could associate 
impressions—similarity, proximity and so on—and even if we select one, there is no 
guarantee that the criterion we select will have any necessary and essential relation to 
objective reality. All activity of association, as an activity of mere selection, can therefore 
only ever remain at the level of description and cannot provide an underlying rule for the 
combination of impressions into meaningful wholes. Therefore Cassirer concludes that, 
for the empiricist theory of association, “it is evident that this term designates only the 
naked fact of combination as such, but does not say anything whatsoever regarding its 
specific character and law. The diversity of the paths and directions by which 
consciousness arrives at its syntheses is totally obscured.”57 Thus empiricism, in its 
inability to clearly illuminate the mechanisms of association ends up merely 
presupposing this very phenomenon of the combination of impressions, rather than 
explaining it. 
Where empiricism sought the basis of the combination of impressions in the 
impressions themselves, rationalism dismisses any possibility of finding the basis of 
combination within sensibility. Rather, it finds this basis in the mind’s power of 
judgment. For the rationalist, the images we are presented with in sensation remain mere 
images and do not contain any principle of the unity of objects. Such a unity can only 	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come about through the inspection of the mind, via the unconscious power of judgment, 
which remains totally independent from impressions and therefore, as Cassirer observes, 
approaches the phenomenon of perception from the outside. 
This fundamental theory of rationalism stands in the sharpest antithesis to the 
empiricist theory of “associations”—but it too fails to overcome the inner tension 
between two fundamentally different elements of consciousness, between its mere 
“matter” and its pure “form.” For here too the synthesis of the contents of 
consciousness is based upon an activity which in some way approaches the 
particular contents from outside.58 
 
The rationalist theory, in maintaining the original separation between sensuous 
impressions (“matter”) and their articulation into meaningful wholes (“form”), thereby 
“approaches from the outside” because it relies on a power of judgment which is external 
to sensation.59 For the rationalist, outward perception presents us only with images that 
are purely subjective. Only pure thought, the power of judgment, enables us to recognize 
any unity among the diversity of impressions. But this unity is a purely formal unity, as 
Cassirer notes, “which can neither be heard nor seen as such, but can be apprehended 
only in the logical process of pure thought.”60 But in leaving this unity solely in the realm 
of thought, rationalism is unable to make contact with the perceived world. Perception, 
for the rationalist, remains meaningless in so far as no synthesis of the contents of 
perception is possible when judgment remains entirely exterior to the actual contents of 
sensation. Rationalism remains as equally vague about the power of judgment as the 
empiricist did about the principle of association, resulting—on the part of the 
rationalist—in the same presupposition of the combining power rather than its 	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association is also something applied to an already existing layer of impressions. Even if the empiricist 
posits the basis of association in the impressions themselves, he still presumes that association is logically 
posterior to the reception of the unformed impressions themselves. 
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explanation. Both theories therefore fail to fully develop the fundamental relation 
between the sensory and the intellectual elements of perception and end up presupposing 
the very fact of the combination of impressions that they sought to justify. 
 Ultimately, both empiricism and rationalism fail for Cassirer because they both 
begin from the position that there is a separation, a mutual exclusivity, between the 
mundus sensibilis and the mundus intelligiblilis. Each accordingly presumes that the 
senses passively receive the unformed matter of sensation and then each is left to justify 
the basis of the giving of form to these impressions. But for Cassirer, beginning from this 
position means that neither empiricism nor rationalism is ever able to justify how the 
content of our consciousness reflects an objective reality. 
But what both overlook in equal degree is the circumstance that all the 
psychological or logical processes, here invoked, come in a manner of speaking 
too late; they all refer to a combination of elements which are viewed as in some 
way existing, as established before the combination. But the question involved 
here does not begin with the possibility and basis of combination; it is concerned 
with the possibility of positing the ability to combine. No associative connection 
of mere impressions and no logical interweaving of them, however close, can 
explain the original mode of postulation inherent in the fact that a phenomenon 
points to an objective reality, that it is given as a factor in an objective intuition.61 
 
Empiricism and rationalism each arrive “too late” because they presuppose an original 
separation which must then be overcome. What both fail to account for is that in the 
phenomenon of perception, at every moment, the objective world is already combined 
into a world that is meaningful.62 There is an obvious parallel here with Merleau-Ponty’s 
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62 If we were to try to articulate the difference between empiricism and rationalism in terms of the notion of 
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perception to sensation collapses any symbolic distance, and that rationalism in placing the burden of 
meaning and understanding entirely within the realm of pure thought magnifies our symbolic distance to 
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account of how both empiricism and rationalism fail to grasp the phenomenon of 
experience. 
Where empiricism was deficient was in any internal connection between the 
object and the act which it triggers off. What intellectualism lacks is contingency 
in the occasions of thought. In the first case consciousness is too poor, in the 
second too rich for any phenomena to appeal compellingly to it. Empiricism 
cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not 
be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see that we need to be ignorant of 
what we are looking for, or equally again we should not be searching.63 
 
But just as Merleau-Ponty is as critical of Kant as he is of Descartes, so too does Cassirer 
see fault in Kant’s solution to the problem of reconciling these disparate factors of 
perception. However, Cassirer does recognize the important advance that Kant makes by 
reversing the direction of the problem. 
Kant makes an important step toward reconciling the dilemma between the 
empiricist demand for the passivity of the senses and rationalist demand for the 
spontaneous activity of the mind, by making them both essential components in 
perception. In keeping with his Copernican turn toward the subject, Kant’s critical 
method represents a reversal in the traditional direction of the analysis of perception. 
Where previously the world of things was taken to be in some way the cause of the 
phenomenon of perception (and hence of our knowledge), now the subject itself is seen 
as playing an active role in constructing its knowledge of the world through perception. 
As Cassirer observes, Kant’s analysis “moves not from things to phenomena but from 
phenomena to things. Accordingly, it must look on perception and its properties not as 
conditioned from outside, but as conditioning—that is, as a constitutive factor in our 
knowledge of things.”64 Our perceptual experience is only possible on the basis of the 	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interaction of sensibility and the spontaneous formative power of the a priori concepts of 
the understanding. As Cassirer notes, the question for Kant then becomes one of how to 
fit the given data of sensation into the a priori concepts of the understanding, which do 
not originate in sensation.65 But Cassirer argues that the answer to this question remains 
ambiguous in Kant. For while Kant appears to recognize the need for the simultaneity of 
matter and form in perception, his account of the powers involved remains “expressed in 
the concepts of eighteenth century faculty psychology.”66 Our faculty of sensation 
receives unformed impressions, the matter of sensation, and our faculty of the 
understanding imparts form to those impressions and in so doing allows them to become 
a content for consciousness. But formulated in this way the “matter” of sensation that we 
receive from our senses and the “form” which is imparted to it by the understanding 
remain originally separate and belong to two different domains. Kant’s conception of 
perception can thus be construed as maintaining that the faculties are empirically real, 
resulting in the same dualism between the physical and intellectual aspects of perception 
that empiricism and rationalism upheld. As Cassirer observes, “And even with Kant, in 
the beginning of his Critique of Pure Reason, this antithesis between sensibility and 
thought, between the “material” and “formal” determinates of consciousness, retains its 
full force.”67 Sensation and understanding remain two distinct faculties even though they 
may share a common root. Kant seems to undo the very simultaneity of matter and form 
that he is searching for by positing different faculties that empirically contribute these 
elements in the process of perception. As Cassirer notes, in this interpretation of Kant the 
question of perception becomes a question of empirical faculty psychology and the 	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understanding becomes merely “a magician and necromancer animating dead sensation, 
awakening it to the life of consciousness.”68 For Cassirer, this represents an unfortunate 
abstraction of theoretical thinking, where what is called for is an account of the actual 
phenomenon of perception. 
Additionally, Cassirer argues that throughout the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
subordinates any analysis of the subjective aspects of perceptive consciousness to the 
overall project of grounding objective, scientific knowledge. Kant therefore treats the 
analysis of perception in the same manner as he treats the analysis of the theoretical 
knowledge of the exact sciences, subordinating them to the same a priori concepts, and in 
so doing misses the diversity of forms of knowledge that are possible outside the sphere 
of the exact natural sciences. As Cassirer observes: 
And when the transcendental critique seeks to disclose the structure of objective 
knowledge, it may not limit itself to the intellectual “sublimation” of experience, 
to the superstructure of theoretical science, but must learn to understand the 
substructure, the world of “sensory” perceptions, as a specifically determined and 
specifically organized context, as a spiritual cosmos sui generis.69 
 
It is precisely this understanding of the world of perceptions, which Cassirer articulates in 
his concept of symbolic pregnance, which will be the focus of the next section. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty recognized the importance of Cassirer’s demand for an 
understanding of experience founded upon the simultaneity of matter and form, and 
praises Cassirer in a footnote to the Phenomenology of Perception. But Merleau-Ponty 
also issues a criticism. 
E. Cassirer clearly has the same aim when he takes Kant to task for having most 
of the time analysed only an ‘intellectual sublimation of experience’ (Philosophie 
der Symbolischen Formen, T. III, p. 14), when he tries to express, through the 
notion of symbolic pregnancy, the absolute simultaneity of matter and form, or 	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when he adopts for his own purposes Hegel’s declaration that the mind carries 
and preserves its past in the depths of its present…When Cassirer takes up the 
Kantian formula according to which consciousness can analyse only what it has 
synthesized, he is manifestly returning to intellectualism despite the 
phenomenological and even existential analyses which his book contains and 
which we shall have occasion to use.70 
 
Merleau-Ponty praises Cassirer for both his notion of symbolic pregnance and his 
assertion of the simultaneity of matter and form, yet he also criticizes Cassirer for 
returning to a Kantian formula for consciousness. Although Merleau-Ponty does mention 
and cite Cassirer frequently throughout the Phenomenology of Perception, he does not 
deal with Cassirer’s arguments in any detail. Nor does he provide further evidence to 
support his assertion of Cassirer’s intellectualism. Krois views Merleau-Ponty’s criticism 
here as a confusion of language, stating that “…Merleau-Ponty also sees an inconsistency 
in Cassirer or, at least, in his language…Cassirer’s language is, in fact, often “Kantian” 
and “intellectualistic,” yet his doctrine is not.”71 Krois goes on to argue that Cassirer’s 
theory runs counter to any intellectualism, because of its insistence that the expressive 
phenomena, which are the basis of all perception, are not the result of activities of the 
mind, but are inherently and immediately meaningful. 
For Cassirer neither the empiricist, rationalist nor Kantian theories of perception 
succeed at explaining how we achieve a genuine synthesis because none of them are able 
to account for the simultaneity of the sensory and intellectual aspects that we experience 
in the phenomenon of perception. What is therefore required for a successful account of 
how our perceptive experiences are meaningful is not another theory which begins only 
after the material and ideal aspects of perception have split from each other, but one 
which originates from a place where these disparate aspects of perception are not yet 	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taken as substantially different and mutually exclusive. As Cassirer suggests, “…the 
unity of the matter and form of consciousness, of the “particular” and the “universal,” of 
sensory “data” and pure “principles of order,” constitutes precisely that originally certain 
and originally known phenomenon which every analysis of consciousness must take as 
its point of departure.”72 This point of departure is Cassirer’s notion of symbolic 
pregnance. 
 
2.2 Symbolic Pregnance 
Symbolic pregnance is the central concept of Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic 
forms. It is what Krois appropriately calls Cassirer’s “transcendental theory of meaning” 
and “the key to understanding how Cassirer’s thought constitutes a transformation of 
transcendental philosophy.”73 Cassirer himself suggests this when he writes that the 
symbolic process which is involved in symbolic pregnance “is precisely the pure relation 
which governs the building of consciousness and which stands out in it as a genuine a 
priori, an essentially first factor.”74 While “Symbolische Prägnanz” has no direct English 
translation, as Krois notes the term “Prägnanz” “derives from the German prägen (to mint 
or coin and give a sharp contour) and the Latin praegnens (laden or ready to give birth). 
It embodies at once the ideas of giving form and fecundity.”75 Symbolic pregnance has 
two possible philosophical origins, or references. The first is Leibniz, to whom Cassirer 
explicitly refers; the other is to Gestalt psychology. Both references share commonalities 
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with Cassirer’s use of the term, although Cassirer’s use is not reducible to either alone. 
We shall first examine the connection to Leibniz. 
 There is no doubt that Cassirer’s work, especially his early work, was influenced 
significantly by Leibniz. Both Cassirer’s dissertation (completed in 1899) and his first 
book (the 1902 Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen) focused on 
Leibniz. When introducing the idea of symbolic pregnance Cassirer makes explicit 
reference to Leibniz’s idea of praengans futuri, which can be found in the Monadology76 
and in more elaborated terms in the Theodicy: 
It is true that God sees all at once the whole sequence of this universe, when he 
chooses it, and that thus he has no need of the connexion of effects and causes in 
order to foresee these effects. But since his wisdom causes him to choose a 
sequence in perfect connexion, he cannot but see one part of the sequence in the 
other. It is one of the rules of my system of general harmony, that the present is big 
[pregnant] with the future, and that he who sees all sees in that which is that which 
shall be…There must therefore be no doubt that effects follow their causes 
determinately, in spite of contingency and even freedom, which nevertheless exist 
together with certainty or determination.77 
 
The similarity to Cassirer’s use of symbolic pregnance is twofold: that the particular 
contains a necessary reference to other particulars and to the whole; and in terms of 
temporality which, for Cassirer, the “now” always bears reference to past and future 
nows. As Cassirer writes: “The phenomena of consciousness do not flit by as mere 
momentary images; what is given here points to a not-here, and what is given now points 
backward or forward to a not-now without this, the phenomenon of an intuitive world 
could not be understood or even described.”78 
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The other source for Cassirer’s term “symbolic pregnance” is from Gestalt 
psychology. This connection is the one typically cited by Cassirer’s commentators as the 
origin of the term. While Cassirer does not explicitly make reference to Gestalt 
psychology in his chapter on symbolic pregnance, he was well aware of, and greatly 
influenced by, Gestalt psychology. This is immediately evident in the section on the 
pathology of the symbolic consciousness which immediately follows the section on 
symbolic pregnance. Cassirer draws extensively in that section upon the work of his 
cousin, Kurt Goldstein, in analyzing pathological cases where reduced symbolic function 
results. That section serves as a negative proof for symbolic pregnance. Cassirer also 
frequently cites the work of well-known Gestalt psychologists Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang 
Koehler. Koffka summarizes the principle as: “psychological organization will always be 
as “good” as the prevailing conditions allow. In this definition the term “good” is 
undefined. It embraces such properties as regularity, symmetry, simplicity and 
others…”79 The term “good,” as later noted by Koffka, also refers to stability of 
organization. As Krois notes, Cassirer does make direct reference to Gestalt Psychology 
in connection with symbolic pregnance in an unpublished manuscript: 
From the standpoint of Gestalt psychology to every particular kind of Gestalt and 
Gestalt formation there corresponds also a particular kind of ‘Praegnanz’…there 
is spatial and temporal Praegnanz, theoretical and aesthetic Praegnanz—but here 
we must go further here and say from our point of view: the specific 
particularization of ‘Praegnanz’ is what first founds and makes possible the 
specific differences among ‘Gestalten’; all representation is always representation 
in a specific ‘sense’.80 
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While Cassirer’s use of symbolic pregnance may originate both in Leibniz and in Gestalt 
psychology, we should not make the same mistake as Freudenthal81 in assuming that 
Cassirer is adopting either position in its entirety, and that his use of the term does not 
have its own specific meaning in reference to the philosophy of symbolic forms. 
Cassirer’s particular sense of symbolic pregnance has its origin in his early work, 
Substance and Function. There Cassirer recognizes the need for all of our perceptions to 
not merely be present, but also to represent, and moreover that representation is 
immediately part of perception, not something subsequently added to it. 
Hence if we understand “representation” as the expression of an ideal rule, which 
connects the present, given particular with the whole, and combines the two in an 
intellectual synthesis, then we have in “representation” no mere subsequent 
determination, but a constitutive condition of all experience. Without this 
apparent representation, there would also be no presentation, no immediately 
present content; for this latter only exists for knowledge in so far as it is brought 
into a system of relations, that give it spatial and temporal as well as conceptual 
determinateness.82 
 
This notion that every particular content of perception contains an immediate reference to 
the whole, and that this is a condition for the possibility of all perception, is also the key 
notion of symbolic pregnance. The same insight is reintroduced and further developed in 
the first volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: 
All these relations…disclose the same fundamental characteristic of 
consciousness, namely, that the whole is not obtained from its parts, but that every 
notion of a part already encompasses the notion of the whole, not as to content, 
but as to a general structure and form. Every particular belongs from the outset to 
a definite complex and in itself expresses the rule of this complex. It is the totality 
of these rules which constitutes the true unity of consciousness, as a unity of time, 
space, objective synthesis, etc.83 
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It is this reciprocal relation which structures all aspects of consciousness—that a part 
always stands in relation to and represents a whole, and equally that the whole is known 
only through its parts—that forms the essential relation described by symbolic pregnance. 
Accordingly, Cassirer defines symbolic pregnance: 
By symbolic pregnance we mean the way in which a perception as a sensory 
experience contains at the same time a certain nonintuitve meaning which it 
immediately and concretely represents. Here we are not dealing with bare 
perceptive data, on which some sort of apperceptive acts are later grafted, through 
which they are interpreted, judged, transformed. Rather, it is the perception itself 
which by virtue of its own immanent organization, takes on a kind of spiritual 
articulation—which, being ordered in itself, also belongs to a determinate order of 
meaning… It is this ideal interwoveness, this relatedness of the single perceptive 
phenomenon, given here and now, to characterize a total meaning that the term 
“pregnance” is meant to designate.”84 
 
Symbolic pregnance is therefore the property of our perception that permits it to 
immediately contain a non-intuitive meaning, that is, a meaning which is not “given” as 
mere sensation. This meaning arises from the fact that every particular stands in some 
determinate relation to the whole of perception and, indeed, of consciousness. This 
meaning is not added to perception by some subsequent activity of the mind, it is 
immediately part of perception itself. In this way, Cassirer is able to avoid the necessity 
of postulating bare, unformed sensory impressions. To illustrate this relation of symbolic 
pregnance Cassirer uses the example of a line drawing—a simple curve. This line, 
unchanging in itself, may be perceived in dramatically different ways depending upon the 
context in which we experience it. It may been seen as a work of art, or perhaps as a 
symbol proper to a cult which carries a magical significance, or perhaps it is perceived by 
the mathematician as the representation of a trigonometric function. The line is itself 
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pregnant with a meaning which is conditioned by the total context in which we 
experience it. 
Cassirer also articulates the relationship present in symbolic pregnance in terms of 
an integral and differential of perception. Each particular perceptual content, by virtue of 
the fact that it has differentiated itself from the whole, is able to integrate non-present 
factors into itself. This idea was already at work in the first volume of Cassirer’s 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms:  
Every “simple” quality of consciousness has a definite content only in so far as it 
is apprehended in complete unity with certain qualities but separately from others. 
The function of this unity and this separation is not removable from the content of 
consciousness but constitutes one of its essential conditions. Accordingly there is 
no “something” in consciousness that does not eo ipso and without further 
mediation give rise to “another” and to a series of others. For what defines each 
particular content of consciousness is that in it the whole of consciousness is in 
some form posited and represented. Only in and through this representation does 
what we call the “presence” of the content become possible.85 
 
Cassirer goes on to express this notion that each element of experience is both separate 
from, yet carries a necessary reference to, the whole of perception within the context of 
his discussion of symbolic pregnance by arguing that: “No conscious perception is 
merely given…rather, every perception embraces a definite “character of direction” by 
which it points beyond its here and now. As a mere perceptive differential, it nevertheless 
contains within itself the integral of experience.”86 This characteristic of a particular 
content of perception carrying within it the “integral of experience”, that is, a reference to 
what we might call the entire perceptual field, is the crucial moment of symbolic 
pregnance. It is this structure that makes an objective reality possible for us, rather than 
merely a dissociated layer of impressions. As Cassirer writes: “It is participation in this 	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structure that gives to the phenomenon its objective reality and determinacy. The 
symbolic pregnance that it gains detracts in no way from its concrete abundance; but it 
does provide a guarantee that this abundance will not simply dissipate itself, but will 
round itself into a stable, self-contained form.”87 Our perceptive experience achieves this 
stability and meaning because a particular element of perception differentiates itself—
stands out against—the remainder of the sensory whole88 yet in so doing points beyond 
itself to that whole of perceptive experience. Indeed, as Gestalt psychology demonstrates 
very well, that particular element of experience that stands out can shift, and in so doing 
its meaning and the meaning of the whole shifts along with it. Thus, as we already quoted 
Cassirer as saying, every particular of perception embraces a certain “character of 
direction.” In this manner, symbolic pregnance represents the condition for the possibility 
of any meaningful experience, and is why Krois calls this notion Cassirer’s 
transcendental theory of meaning. 
We have just seen how meaningful perception is made possible because the 
particulars of perception are always contained within some sort of structure in relation to 
the whole. We might now ask, returning to the framework of the empiricist/rationalist 
debate, whether this symbolic meaning originates in sensation or in an activity of the 
mind. Of course, to even ask this question is to miss the point of Cassirer’s argument, 
since it is precisely this abstract dualism that he wishes to avoid. As Cassirer points out, 
symbolic pregnance originates neither in sensation nor in the mind alone: 
We have designated as symbolic pregnance the relation in consequence of which 
a sensuous thing embraces a meaning and represents it for consciousness: this 
pregnance can be reduced neither to merely reproductive processes nor to 
mediated intellectual processes—it must ultimately be recognized as an 	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independent and autonomous determination, without which neither an object nor a 
subject, neither a unity of the thing nor a unity of the self would be given to us.89 
 
Cassirer asserts that symbolic pregnance cannot be reduced to a “reproductive process”, 
nor to a “mediated intellectual process”. In other words, symbolic pregnance is not 
something given in the sensations themselves, such that perception is simply a copy of an 
already-given reality—as might be suggested by the empiricists. Nor is it a spontaneous 
act of judgment, a product of the mind’s activity—as might be suggested by the 
rationalists. As Cassirer later writes in his essay, “The Concept of Group and the Theory 
of Perception,” perception is no mere copy of sensation. Rather perception, by virtue of 
symbolic pregnance, effects a genuine synthesis and expands upon the particular datum: 
The essential conclusion hence to be drawn is that perception in general is not 
confined to the mere hic et nunc. Perception expands the particular datum; it is 
integrated into a total experience; and it is only in virtue of this integration that 
perception can exercise its proper function as an objective factor in knowledge. If 
perception were tied up with the flux of impressions, it would necessarily 
disintegrate; for each of these impressions present the size, shape, and color of the 
object in a different way.90 
 
This expanding of a particular datum and integrating it into a total experience is not 
simply a receptive act, for it incorporates the perspective from which we come to have 
experience, nor is it merely an active act, because it does not involve a spontaneous act of 
the mind. Rather, symbolic pregnance proceeds from an entirely different perspective. 
Symbolic pregnance—that is to say, meaningful perception—is only possible on the basis 
of our sensitive body being engaged in some sort of action through time. 
 Human beings as living organisms generally, and as mammals specifically, are 
endowed with sensitive bodies. We are put into contact with our world because our 
bodies are the kinds of things which are open to receiving sensations from that world. But 	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the simple event of receiving a stimulus at a particular moment is not sufficient grounds 
upon which to explain the emergence of symbolic pregnance and meaningful experience. 
As Cassirer writes: 
What distinguishes the living from the dead is precisely that all living things have 
a history; that is to say, that the way in which they react to certain present actions 
depends not only on the nature of the momentary stimulus but also on earlier 
stimuli that have affected the organism…thus what we call conscious perception 
never depends solely on the present state of the body, and particularly of the brain 
and nervous system, but on the totality of the effects that have been exerted on 
them.91 
 
Our perceptions are not simply the products of discrete, momentary interactions of the 
world with our sensitive bodies, rather every perception has a crucial temporal 
component. We must, so to speak, be able to connect together the past, the present, and 
the future, as a condition for the possibility of meaningful perceptive experience. Or, as 
Cassirer articulates it, meaningful experience presupposes “…that a multiplicity of 
temporal determinations occur within the indivisible moment of time, that the total 
content of consciousness given in the simple now is distributed over present, past, and 
future.”92 To illustrate this, Cassirer uses the example of the sense of touch. He asserts 
that motion and time are integral to the sense of touch, and that the properties of rough, 
smooth, or any other tactile phenomenon are only possible through motion. We must 
move our hand over the surface in order to feel it. As Cassirer observes, “…a particular 
sensory experience results from the conception and articulation of a definite temporal 
process…the passage through a sequence which can be apprehended only in succession, 
leads ultimately to a product that has cast off all succession and seems to stand before us 
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as unitary and simultaneous.”93 This example of touch applies equally to all sensation—
visual, olfactory, auditory—and thus all meaningful perception requires us to connect a 
‘series of impressions’ through a certain period of time. Without that ability, we would 
have no sense. 
 But not only is an ability to connect past experiences a requirement for all present 
experiences, but so too is the ability to project ourselves into the future. As Cassirer 
writes, “The ego, which sees itself as standing “in time” views itself not as the sum of 
static events but as a being extending forward into time, striving from the present toward 
the future. Without this form of striving, what we call “representation,” the actualization 
of a content can never begin for us.”94 Without a striving into the future, through an 
expectation, we would be unable to undertake any actions or engage in any projects. And 
in fact our experience of the present is as much conditioned by our memories of the past 
as it is by our expectations of the future. One need only consider the experience of any 
tool or piece of technology. One’s present experience of it is always conditioned by what 
it is we see as its use, what we want to do with it. If one has never used a circular saw, 
and knows nothing of its purpose in construction, one would experience it in a far 
different way than if one were a master carpenter. As Cassirer observes, “in a manner of 
speaking the symbol hastens ahead of reality, showing it the way and clearing its path. 
Symbolic representation is no mere looking back on this reality as something finished, 
but becomes a factor and motif in its unfolding.”95 Consider what is required for this 
master carpenter to employ this saw in the making of a piece of furniture. She must first 
of all take up the project in the first place. This involves the creating of an expectation—I 	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am going to make a table. She must also draw upon her past experience and skills in 
order to be able to plan the project, and equally she must integrate these distinct temporal 
directions into her present actions as the project unfolds. All action therefore requires us 
to integrate the three temporal moments of the past, present, and future. As Cassirer 
writes, “It is this temporal differentiation and integration which first gives to action its 
spiritual imprint, which demands free movement and at the same time requires that this 
movement be unswervingly directed toward the unity of a goal.”96 This characteristic 
kind of temporality, where past, present and future are integrated, and in which all of our 
actions unfold, Cassirer calls historical time. Thus historical time is the precondition for 
meaningful action, but equally for meaningful perception. Indeed all perception, as we 
have seen, requires some minimal form of action, such as the moving of one’s hand over 
a surface or the direction of one’s gaze toward an object. Indeed, all action is also 
formative in the sense that it creates forms. But not only does it create forms external to 
us—things like tables, houses, and equally literature and scientific theory—but also 
action is always self-formative. To act, and hence to brings about changes in one’s past, 
present and future, is always also to change one’s own form and meaning. Thus Cassirer 
writes, 
The true intuition of time cannot be gained in mere recollective memory, but is at 
the same time knowledge and act: the process in which life takes on form, life in 
the spiritual not merely biological sense, and that process in which life comes to 
conceive and know itself—these two must eventually constitute a unity, and 
hence this conceiving is not the merely external apprehension of a finished and 
ready form into which life has been squeezed but is the very way life gives itself 
form in order that in this act of form giving, this formative activity, it may 
understand itself.97 
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We have now seen that the all perceptual experience is meaningful because of symbolic 
pregnance—the simultaneity of the integrative and differentiative aspects in perception—
and that such meaning arises only on the basis of a sensitive body engaged in action 
through the mode of temporality called historical time. We have also suggested that all 
action is equally a process of self-formation. In the next chapter, we turn to see how the 
relationship that Cassirer sees as maintaining between life and spirit is a defining 
relationship for human nature and that it is centered around this self-forming character of 
all activity. 
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Chapter 3: The Formative Power of Life and Spirit 
Cassirer conceives of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as a project of uncovering the 
“riddle of the becoming of form,” concerned specifically with “the dynamics of the 
giving of meaning, in and through which the growth and delimitation of specific spheres 
of being and meaning occur in the first place.”98 As such, the Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms is a study of the ways in which our symbolic interactions with our world give rise 
to increasingly greater and more complex determinations of meaning and objective form. 
For Cassirer, the symbolic is what makes all of our thought, knowledge, action and 
culture possible. Language, technology, religion and scientific knowledge all depend on 
symbols and the symbolic function that inheres in them. As we suggested at the 
conclusion of the previous chapter, all formation of cultural objects is predicated upon a 
process of self-formation. In this chapter we will show how Cassirer’s notion of life is 
such that it is inherently self-formative, by virtue of its intimate relationship with Geist. 
 
3.1 Cassirer’s Metaphysics of Life and Spirit 
Does Cassirer have a metaphysics? This question was taken up by many of 
Cassirer’s early commentators, including those published in the Library of Living 
Philosophers volume on Ernst Cassirer.99 Among those writers, who would have been 
unaware of the existence of the manuscript for The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, the 
majority opinion is that Cassirer did not have a metaphysics and further, that he rejected 
metaphysics outright. For example, Hendrik Pos writes, “As a critic Cassirer was as ill 
deposed to metaphysics as toward that irrationalism which stirred mightily in Germany 	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between the two world wars.”100 But the significance of the question of Cassirer’s 
metaphysics is greater than simply whether he held one or not. Rather, it cuts to the heart 
of his philosophy, as William Curtis Swabey realized, arguing that not only did Cassirer 
reject metaphysics but, moreover, that Cassirer therefore also rejected a fundamental 
reality. For Cassirer, Swabey wrote, “there is no self-existent nature of which we have 
real but imperfect knowledge;…there is progress toward comprehensiveness and 
consistency, but no progressive revelation of a reality which is there, whether known or 
not.”101 In fact, Cassirer does believe in a reality independent of man and made this plain 
at a lecture at Yale. “The ego, the individual mind, cannot create reality. Man is 
surrounded by a reality that he did not make, that he has to accept as an ultimate fact.”102 
It is unsurprising that most early commentators held that Cassirer completely 
rejects metaphysics, since Cassirer himself regularly cautions about the dangers of 
metaphysical thinking. When Cassirer does take metaphysical positions into account, he 
typically does so in order to point out how they have obscured the true nature of the 
matter at hand, often by falsely taking one concept as representative of all of being and 
thereby creating innumerable aporias and antinomies. 
The naïve realism of the ordinary view of the world, like the realism of dogmatic 
metaphysics, falls into this error, ever again. It separates out of the totality of 
possible concepts of reality a single one and sets it up as a norm and pattern for all 
the others. Thus certain necessary formal points of view, from which we seek to 
judge and understand the world of phenomena, are made into things, into absolute 
beings. Whether we characterize this ultimate being as “matter” or “life,” “nature” 
or “history,” there always results for us in the end confusion in our view of the 
world, because certain spiritual functions, that cooperate in its construction, are 
excluded and others are over-emphasized.103 
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However, Carl Hamburg, also writing in the 1949 Library of Living Philosophers 
volume, correctly noted that Cassirer is not dismissive of metaphysics as such, he is 
simply wary of metaphysics which falsely takes one aspect of reality as representative of 
all of being. Hamburg, citing a passage from Substance and Function in which Cassirer 
criticizes metaphysics, and then another from an essay on Axel Hägerström in which 
Cassirer describes metaphysics in a positive light, concludes, “Cassirer’s position is thus 
a consistent one. He does not side with the positivistic contention that metaphysics is not 
only “false,” but also “meaningless.” Instead, he distinguishes the genuine character of 
the problems with which the great metaphysicians have dealt, from the still imperfect 
modes in which their findings have been presented.”104 It is clear that Cassirer did not 
reject metaphysics out of hand—he simply rejected the false dichotomies often arising 
from metaphysical thinking. Not surprisingly, we find that Cassirer himself does not hold 
a metaphysics in the traditional sense. So what are we to make of the posthumously 
published Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms? 
 In the preface to the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Cassirer 
alludes to a concluding chapter to that work which, due to the constraints of time and the 
length of the work, he was unable to include. He indicated that he intended to publish it 
as part of another critical work, to be titled “Life and The Human Spirit—toward a 
Critique of Present-Day Philosophy.”105 While this work was never published, an essay 
that Cassirer had written entitled ““Spirit and “Life” in Contemporary Philosophy” 
subsequently appeared, first in German in 1930, and then in English in 1949.106 This 
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essay was assumed to be the concluding chapter to the third volume of the Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms to which Cassirer had alluded. However, with the publishing of 
Cassirer’s manuscript of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Volume 4: The Metaphysics 
of Symbolic Forms (first in German in 1995 and then in English in 1996) new light has 
been shed on both Cassirer’s metaphysics and on how he viewed the project of the 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as a whole. In the course of their inspection of Cassirer’s 
unpublished papers, which had been brought to Yale, Verene and Krois realized that, in 
fact, the previously published essay thought to be the concluding chapter was, in fact, not 
the one Cassirer had referred to. The actual concluding chapter had been grouped with 
other materials, in varying stages of completion, and was intended to eventually comprise 
a fourth volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, entitled “The Metaphysics of 
Symbolic Forms.” It is to the first chapter of that now published volume, the chapter 
entitled “Life and Geist” that we now turn. 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in its task of reconstructing language, myth 
and theoretical knowledge from their logical beginnings to their complete elaboration, 
brought to light the various differentiations created both within and between the symbolic 
forms. In the Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer now asks, “should not these 
differences at the same time refer us to an overarching whole which embraces them all, as 
aspects, and connects them together?”107 Cassirer is not speaking here of any sort of 
“leveling off” between the forms—of any attempt to reduce them all to a single 
characteristic—instead he wishes to preserve their differences while at the same time 
searching for what unites them. In searching for the basis of this connection, we should 
keep in mind that the symbolic forms were not separated as if “they were cut off with an 	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axe,”108 but were rather shown to have an essential relation to one and other. Not only 
could language not develop without mythical thought, just as theoretical knowledge could 
not develop without language, additionally each form instantiates the symbolic functions 
of expression, representation and signification in various ways and to varying degrees. As 
Cassirer writes, “The actual “concrete” reality of Geist consists rather in the fact that all 
its different basic aspects mesh with one another and coalesce, that, in the true sense of 
the word, they are “concrescent.””109 Therefore, in order to seek the unity of the forms we 
must go back to that realm of concrete lived experience in which we find “creative 
subjectivity” at work. To aid in this task Cassirer proposes a new direction of inquiry—a 
turning away from the finished products of the symbolic forms toward the way in which 
they came to be produced. It is by considering symbolic form in this regard that we will 
be able to see their unity as a unity of origin. (This unity of origin is what Cassirer’s 
metaphysics fundamentally consists.) In the original three volumes of The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms each symbolic form represented a progressive breaking away from the 
immediacy of Life and immediate experience. Spirit, on the other hand, was what was 
seen as a creating force. But these two concepts and the relation between them were not 
made fully explicit. But now, in the Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, Life, Spirit and the 
relation that persists between them have become the central issues. It is Cassirer’s 
metaphysics of Life and Spirit of which we must now give an account. 
Cassirer regards the project of the symbolic forms as uncovering the “riddle of the 
becoming of form”—form which is meaningful and which achieves a degree of validity 
not just for an individual, but equally between individuals. As we will see, Cassirer’s 	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metaphysics of Life and Spirit is therefore an account of the two directions of force, the 
originary difference that gives rise to the symbolic forms. Therefore our elucidation of 
what Cassirer means by “Life” and “Spirit,” and the relation between the two, is by no 
means a simple matter of definition. In fact, no definition can be given for one 
independently of the other, because Life and Spirit cannot be conceived as two 
substantially different things. They are not opposite poles of Being—they are simply 
functionally different. Life and Spirit are intimately bound up in the process of the 
becoming of form, and show themselves only in and through that process. Moreover, 
neither is ever fully revealed through that process. Therefore, to understand Cassirer’s 
conception of Life and Spirit, we must observe it in action. But at the outset of our 
analysis we can, at least provisionally, draw some distinctions to aid us in our 
understanding, even if these distinctions are effaced as we move forward. 
Life is, first and foremost, a biological principle that we share with all other 
animals. Life is manifest in a body that exists in an immediate relation to its environment. 
Life has the character of being-in-itself, it is immersed and enclosed within its immanent 
actuality, and does not grasp the world, nor itself, as an object. The world of life is a 
world of undifferentiated immediacy. The world of Spirit, on the other hand, is 
characterized by differentiation and mediation. Where life is common to all animals, 
Spirit is something cultural and uniquely human. Spirit is able to hold the world at a 
distance and grasp it “objectively.” Unlike Life, Spirit has the character of being-for-
itself, it is self-conscious and able to reflect on itself. Life, as immediate and 
unselfconsciously immersed in its immanent actuality, seems to be what we associate 
with animals. On the other hand Spirit, as mediated and capable of reflecting both upon 
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its world and itself, appears to be characteristically human. But we should be careful not 
to assume that Spirit is something simply added to the otherwise animal aspect of human 
life, something over, above and different from it. As we saw in the first chapter, human 
life is already distinct form animal life by virtue of it symbolic distance. Therefore 
Cassirer writes “The formative activity of the spirit, as demonstrated in its supreme 
creations—in the creation of language and myth, religion, art, cognition—is a 
continuation and sublimation of the formative activity of nature: spiritual form does not 
conflict with organic form but is rather the fulfillment, the maturest fruit of the organic 
process itself.”110 Here we begin to get a sense from Cassirer’s description that life and 
spirit are opposed, yet commensurable. They seem to be both different and identical. We 
get a sense of this identity and difference at the outset of Cassirer’s review of Simmel’s 
metaphysics of life. 
Simmel characterizes human life as that in which “transcendence is immanent.” In 
that characterization life is itself a form which has the power to build new forms and to 
incorporate those into itself. As such, it has the ability to transcend itself. Obviously, 
already in this description we are no longer dealing with simple animal life, but life 
which is also of spirit. The immanence of life consists in its actuality and in its immediate 
absorption into its environment—into nature. But for Simmel, that immanence is only 
one of life’s aspects. The other is life’s transcendence, which consists in its never being 
wholly exhausted in its actuality. “As little as life can ever change its character, since this 
very change itself remains its work and its own activity, so it too can never be wholly 
absorbed in any of its forms, conceived as a closed and compete totality…It is never at 
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one with itself except by being beyond itself at the same time.”111 In other words, the 
actuality of human Life is that it is always potentially more that what it is actually. Life, 
therefore has its transcendence as an immanence to the degree that its determinate 
actuality possess the potentiality to change what it itself is. Its self-identity is that it is 
self-differentiating. Spirit shares with life this character of a self-identity that is self-
differentiating. 
To be sure, life is bound up in its biological existence and as such has the 
character of “being-in-itself and remaining in itself.” For such a being “possesses its 
content and its meaning only as part of this process of life itself, not as something 
opposed to it or in any way approaching it from outside.”112 However, unlike the 
lebensphilosophie which Cassirer argues against, the concept of life is not exhausted by 
its biological immanence. Human life is also characterized by the character of 
transcendence, which, at first, appears to be in contradiction with its immanence, but is in 
fact bound up with it. Having the character of transcendence bound up with immanence 
means that an essential characteristic of life is that it strives to overcome its actuality, its 
current form. Life is at once a determinate actuality and a potentiality. This striving, this 
desire to transcend itself is immanent in human life. Hence, Simmel summarizes, “Life is 
at once flux without pause and yet something enclosed in bearers and contents, formed 
about midpoints, individualized, and therefore always a bounded form which continually 
jumps its bounds. That is its essence.”113 For Cassirer, this dual nature of life—as 
bounded yet capable of transcending its boundaries—is “not only the original source of 
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geist but also its archetype and prototype.”114 Therefore, the “turn to life” that 
characterizes Simmel’s metaphysics necessarily involves a “turn to the idea.” For 
Simmel, Cassirer notes, the two are inseparably bound up. 
This consists for him in the fact that what appeared at first to be a pure creation of 
life, to be integrated into and at the service of its continuing course, is not bound 
exclusively to this state of affairs, but rather proves to have its own significance 
and autonomous meaning. The realm of the “idea” is made accessible to us and 
arises for us by the forms and functions that life has brought about for its own 
sake, out of its own dynamics to become independent and definite…only after this 
change has taken place do the great intellectual categories, which previously 
seemed passive in contrast to life, become productive in the true sense;115 
 
Life, in its process of creating form, endows this form with a meaning and significance 
which transcends the immediate meaning of the life which created it. The process through 
which life achieves form is therefore not one of life “jumping over its own shadow.” 
There is no such thing as pure life without form. Life is itself formed from the outset and 
as such life and form are not polar opposites in being, they are simply two accents we fix 
in the process of becoming. 
To clarify this processes of the becoming of form, Cassirer uses the example of 
language. The becoming of form is never the giving of a fixed and final form, the 
symbolic forms take their significance and vitality from their process of becoming. In 
language, for example, we can at first view the creative process as being opposed to the 
forms that are therein created. Specifically, the process of creating meaning seems 
opposed to the limitations imposed by the grammatical rules and structure inherent in 
language. But Cassirer urges us, as mentioned in the first chapter, to follow Humboldt in 
conceiving language not as ergon, as a product, but as energeia, an activity or power, a 
potentiality, “not merely something which has become what it is, but which is 	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continuously shaping itself.”116 Language only ever exists in its specific determinations, 
in the act of speech or writing. But at the same time language is never wholly present in 
any of its determinations, its power is never exhausted in an individual act of language, 
nor in the aggregate of all individual language acts. Rather we must understand the 
speech act as the creation of a meaning, which did not exist prior to the act. Therefore 
Cassirer writes, 
The individual speech act does not hereby take place when the speaker merely 
reaches into a world of completely finished forms from which a selection has to 
be made but which otherwise must be treated as given, like a minted coin. The 
speech act is never in this sense an act of mere assimilation; rather, it is, in 
however small a way, a creative act, an act of shaping and reshaping. It is a 
completely one-sided and insufficient conception of this act to regard it as though 
the subject was inhibited and constricted at every turn and with every step by a 
world of forms as something already present, as though it had to struggle against 
them to make its way. Here the form does not prove to be such an impediment, 
but an organ that is always ready, in fact an organ whose value rests on its being 
modifiable and mutable in the highest measure.117 
 
The processes of linguistic creation involves a coming up against the determinations of 
language, such that one might imagine language as being a constraint on the expression 
and creation of meaning—constrained by vocabulary and the determinate grammatical 
rules. But in fact these determinations within language, while constraining, are equally 
the condition for the possibility of the creation of new meaning. Cassirer raises the 
example of Goethe, but we could take any poet. We can imagine the poet struggling, not 
being able to quite express what she wants. Nevertheless, eventually, after trying many 
combinations of words and images, discovers through some mystery of genius a new way 
of expressing her intention. In such a situation, the grammatical rules and constraints of 
language were first seen to be a limitation, but then proved to be “a pure formative 	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energy with an unlimited openness”118 that made the expression of a genuinely new 
meaning possible. This dual nature of spiritual products, to be both limiting and limitless, 
to simultaneously constrict and open up possibilities, is not an irresolvable contradiction, 
but an essential and mutually supporting aspect of spirit. “This creation would have to be 
evanescent, would have to disappear like a breath into the air, if in the midst of its rise 
and development it did not meet with something that was already developed. This is not 
mere “matter” for it, but a product of and a witness to the same forces that brought it 
about.”119 In other words, the possibility of the creation of form and menaing, is that we 
always encounter some existing form and meaning which can itself be used and reshaped 
by spirit. 
This idea is expressed by Cassirer when he writes that form is always form-that-
is-becoming. It is, as he says, an interplay between forma formans (form forming) and 
forma formata (form already formed) that creates spiritual life itself. “The forma formans 
that becomes forma formata, which it must become for the sake of its own self-
preservation without ever becoming redued to it, retains the power to regain itself from it, 
to be born again as forma formans—this is what is distinctive of the development of geist 
and culture.”120 In other words, the process of creating form yields a form which has been 
created and that new creation itself is therefore capable of creating ever new forms. This 
continual process is that through which Spirit develops itself. 
All meaning must retain this “vital” quality, that of a continual becoming. Life, in 
the process of giving form and creating meaning, “comes to itself” through a process of 
self-differentiation. 	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So, if we see it in the mirror of the “symbolic forms,” the turn to the idea” cannot 
be described as life bidding itself farewell in order to go forth into something 
foreign and distant from itself; rather, life must be seen as returning to itself, it 
“comes to itself” in the medium of the symbolic forms. It possess and grasps itself 
in the imprint of form as the infinite possibility of formation, as the will to form 
and power to form. Even life’s limitation becomes its own act; what from outside 
seems to be its fate, its necessity, proves to be a witness to its freedom and self-
formation.121 
 
Life gives itself limitations and rules, but in taking up these rules into itself is able to 
create new possibilities. This involves a process of activity which transforms these rules 
from something external and alien, to something which has become part of life itself, 
become a new potentiality. 
 Looking back on the road we have travelled up to now and seeing how form and 
life are intertwined, Cassirer poses a question. “The question appears in the end to consist 
not in whether form is capable of movement but whether the kind of mobility that takes 
place in and through form is up to the pure mobility of life and can accord with it. Does 
the turn to form mean an intensification of this pure motility of life, or does it not, rather, 
really mean its slackening and degeneration?”122 As Cassirer notes, in the romantics as 
well as in modern metaphysics of lebensphilosopie, the world of life on the one hand is 
irreconcilably set off from the world of form and spirit on the other, such that any 
progress in the realm of spirit is a move away from the realm of life. So the question 
remains, is the finitude of life opposed to the infinity of Spirit? Spirit, Cassirer says, is an 
undifferentiated and infinite primordial ground from which specific, definite and, 
therefore, limited configurations arise. But these finite products do not stand in 
opposition to the infinity of Spirit, because these products are themselves not simply 
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products, as forma formata, but are also energies, potential and material of new forms, 
forma formans. Thus Cassirer writes, 
The infinity which is denied to the finished configuration lives in the pure process 
of configuration. This does not become solidified in any individual creation, 
because it is the eternally productive act…The law of meaning to which it is 
subject and by virtue of which it is continually reborn—not what is created from 
it—provides its true content. If this law were completely antagonistic to life, it 
would at the same time have to destroy its own essence, for it exists and has 
application only insofar as it is active, and it cannot become active in any way 
except by entering and by constantly resubmerging itself into the living world. 
Always changing, but ever itself, near and far and far and near, geist in all of its 
productivity always stands opposed to life without ever turning against it, without 
ever being antagonistic toward it.” 123 
 
Thus the products of spirit are not the true content of Spirit, but rather the law of meaning 
is. Spirit, as this law of meaning, can only be active by entering and constantly 
resubmerging itself into life. Spirit is opposed to life, but it is not antagonistic toward life, 
it does not seek to destroy life. Spirit continually pulls life from its immanence, but must 
continually return life to its immanence. They are each the fulfillment of the other. 
Therefore we cannot understand Life in its fullness if it is taken in abstraction from Spirit, 
nor can we fully understand Spirit taken in abstraction from Life. But Life and Spirit do 
not form a simple identity, they are also essentially different from each other. Therefore, 
to the extent that we cannot fully grasp one without the other, so too we cannot fully 
grasp their unity without knowledge of their essential difference. 
 
3.2 Conclusion 
In this chapter we saw that Cassirer conceives of life and spirit as concepts which are 
intimately bound up with each other, such that one cannot be understood separately from 
the other. We saw that the body, and the biological existence to which life is bound, in 	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one sense cuts life off from the infinite world of spirit. However, on the other hand, life is 
body and limitation, its being determined in some form, is also that in virtue of which it is 
able to create new forms and participate in spirit. Correspondingly, we saw that spirit is 
on the one hand an infinite and limitless realm of meaning, but that its essence and 
meaning can only ever be expressed in the limited nature of form. Most importantly, we 
also saw that all form—whether it be language or to life itself—is both forma formans 
and forma formata, that is, form which exists as a product, but equally form which is 
itself the capacity to produce new form, that is, form forming. This is the same insight we 
expressed in the previous chapter as the conception of symbolic form as an enegia, an 
energy or potential. Let us now attempt to bring together the three chapters. But first let 
us remind ourselves of the characterization that Heidegger gave of Cassirer’s philosophy: 
I believe that what I describe by Dasein does not allow translation into a concept 
of Cassirer’s. Should one say consciousness, that is precisely what I rejected. 
What I call Dasein is essentially codetermined—not just through what we 
describe as spirit, and not just through what we call living. Rather, it depends on 
the original unity and the immanent structure of the relatedness of a human being, 
which to a certain extent has been fettered in a body and which, in the fetteredness 
in the body, stands in a particular condition of being bound up with beings. In the 
midst of this it finds itself, not in the sense of a spirit that gazes down upon it, but 
rather in the sense that Dasein, thrown into the midst of beings, carries out as free 
an incursion into entities, an incursion that is always historical and, in the ultimate 
sense, contingent.124 
 
In the introduction we said that, contrary to Heidegger’s characterization, we would show 
that Cassirer’s philosophy entailed a conception of the human subject that is an essential 
unity, whose embodiment and historical temporality are the conditions for the possibility 
of meaning and action. Let us trace back through the path we have taken a build up this 
picture of Cassirer’s conception of the human subject. 
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In the first Chapter we argued that Cassirer’s conception of human life is centered 
around the symbol. We saw that Cassirer rejected reason as the all-encompassing 
determinate of human life and instead turned toward the symbol as the basic principle of 
human culture. We further saw in Cassirer’s description of humanity as animal 
symbolicum that this turn to the symbolic resulted in not only a reinterpretation of human 
culture, but equally a new model of the character of human life. We then saw that human 
use of the symbol creates a symbolic distance which gives us the power to build up a 
cultural world. In the second section we demonstrated how Cassirer’s conception of the 
symbolic in general is based in life. We saw how Cassirer’s definition of the symbol was 
not restricted to artificial, cultural products, but that it equally encompasses the natural 
symbolism that we find in perception and anyway meaning is present. We then saw that, 
contrary to the general trend, Cassirer did not base his conception of the symbol on 
language. Cassirer viewed the symbolic form of myth as primary and ultimately based his 
conception of the symbolic in the realm of life, refereeing to the body-soul relationship as 
the “model and prototype” for all symbolic relations. 
In the second chapter we argued that empiricist, rationalist and Kantian theories 
of perception all failed to explain how the material and ideal come together in perception 
to present us with meaningful experience. We saw that since both began from the 
assumption that the material and ideal aspects of perception are originally separate, 
neither the empiricist theory of the association of impressions, nor the rationalist theory 
of judgment was able to fully explain how they are reunited. We then saw that Kant made 
an advance over each of these theories by placing the perceiving subject, rather than the 
perceived object, at the centre of the problem. Although Kant tried to incorporate both the 
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empiricist demand for the receptivity of the senses and the rationalist demand for the 
spontaneity of the mind, he nevertheless failed to fully bridge the gap by merely 
installing these disparate aspects into different faculties, rather than truly affecting a 
unification. We then turned in the second section to see how Cassirer’s notion of 
symbolic pregnance constitutes his solution to the problem of perception. We saw that 
symbolic pregnance, with its origins in both Leibniz and Gestalt psychology, entails both 
the sense of the fecundity of particular perceptual contents—their necessary reference to 
other particulars and to the whole of perception—as well as the sense of the structuring of 
perception around particulars which are taken as constants and endowed with a meaning. 
We saw that each particular of perception served as both a differential and an integral of 
perception and that this was the condition for the possibility of meaningful perceptive 
experience. We then concluded that symbolic pregnance could not stand entirely on its 
own, put required our sensitive, embodied nature as well as a historical temporality to 
allow us to undertake meaningful action. In other words, we demonstrated that Cassirer 
relies on a conception of humanity which, contrary to Heidegger’s opinion, recognizes 
the essentially embodied and temporal nature of humanity. 
Finally, in the third chapter, we saw that the relationship between life and spirit is 
one which serves as the condition for the possibility of human progress from the finitude 
of its actuality, its current form, to the infinitude of its potentiality. However, in keeping 
with the insight of Cassirer’s notion of forma formans and forma formata, this striving 
toward spirit is always limited by life. This life, is precisely the finite, embodied, 
temporal life which we sought to explicate in the previous chapters. Cassirer, in 
suggesting that humanity is constituted by both life and spirit, is not suggesting that we 
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stem from an original dichotomy as Heidegger suggests. Rather, we are an original unity 
in which “The dissonant is in harmony with itself; the contraries are not mutually 
exclusive, but interdependent: “harmony in contrariety, as in the case of the bow and the 
lyre.”125 
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